This study investigates the audit committee attributes and earnings management of quoted money deposit banks in Nigeria, with the moderating role of leverage. This paper specifically examines the audit committee's independent effect and the moderating role of leverage on earnings management. This paper used an ex post facto research design. A population of 13 banks, and a sample size of 7 banks purposively selected. It employed multiple regression analysis through STATA 13, and the result reveals that the size of the audit committee has a significant negative effect on earnings management. However, audit committee independence has a positive and significant effect. The interaction between leverage and audit committee size positively moderates the relationship, reducing the negative impact of audit committee size on earnings management. However, the interaction between leverage and audit committee independence is negative and insignificant. This paper concludes that both large audit committee size and leverage have a strong negative impact on EM, which is in alignment with the focus of agency theory on governance mechanisms. Yet, independence has a beneficial association with EM, and the moderating effect of leverage is different; namely, it gains strength with size but is not significant with independence. The paper recommends that firms should ensure that they set minimum sizes of audit committees and practical independence rather than formal requirements and include levels of leverage in governance codes to increase monitoring levels in high-debt companies.